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Abstract
This paper introduces a generalization of Reiter’s notion of “extension” for default logic. The main
difference from the original version mainly lies in the way conflicts among defaults are handled: in
particular, this notion of “general extension” allows defaults not explicitly triggered to pre-empt
other defaults. A consequence of the adoption of such a notion of extension is that the collection
of all the general extensions of a default theory turns out to have a nontrivial algebraic structure.
This fact has two major technical fall-outs: first, it turns out that every default theory has a general
extension; second, general extensions allow one to define a well-behaved, skeptical relation of
defeasible consequence for default theories, satisfying the principles of Reflexivity, Cut, and Cautious
Monotonicity formulated by D. Gabbay.
Alternative developments are also considered, namely: (i) the important case of semi-normal
default theories (which turn out to have a unique minimal extension); (ii) defeasible consequence
as based on extensions that are nonminimal (“optimal” in the sense of Manna and Shamir); and
(iii) a variant of general extensions that, at the cost of a slight complication, avoids certain somewhat
counterintuitive results.
This approach, inspired by Kripke’s theory of truth, is parallel to, and generalizes over, the
treatment of defeasible inheritance over cyclic networks obtained in the author’s previous work;
vindicates the skeptical approach to defeasible inheritance of Horty, Thomason, and Touretzky; and
has similarities to the results of Fitting and Przymusin´ski in logic programming. Ó 1999 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
The emergence of so-called nonmonotonic logics through the work of, among others,
McCarthy [23,24], McDermott and Doyle [25], Moore [26], and Reiter [30] is undoubtedly
one of the most significant developments both in logic and in artificial intelligence.
Among the several formalisms proposed in the literature, Reiter’s default logic in particular
seems to provide a very flexible general-purpose framework. This paper introduces a
generalization of Reiter’s notion of “extension” for default logic, which can be motivated
by the following considerations.
All nonmonotonic logics aim to provide a formal account of the fact that reasoners
can reach conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further
information. As a consequence, a certain amount of “jumping to the conclusion” is built
right into any nonmonotonic framework, in the form (particularly explicit in the case of
default logic) of defeasible inference rules. Nonmonotonicity amounts precisely to the
proviso that if conflicts were to arise, one would “retract” some of the conclusions in order
to restore consistency.
However, there are in principle two different kinds of conflict that can arise: (i) conflicts
between tentatively endorsed conclusions and newly learned facts (strict information)
about the world; and (ii) conflicts among the conclusions of the defeasible rules. All
nonmonotonic frameworks handle the first kind of conflict in the same way: rules whose
conclusions are inconsistent with the given information are not triggered; hence, if new
facts were to be learned, old conclusions would be retracted (nonmonotonicity). On the
other hand, there are in principle two different ways to handle conflicts of the second
kind. According to the first strategy one can be “credulous” and always trigger a maximal
subset of inference rules; i.e., one always commits to as many conclusion as possible
subject to the consistency requirement. But an equally acceptable alternative is to be
“skeptical” or “cautious” and withhold commitment to a conclusion in the presence of
conflicting rules. (Further considerations may also play a role: for instance, in the case
of inheritance networks one usually wants more “specific” information to override more
“generic” information.)
The difference between the two approaches is best seen in such cases as the well-known
“Nixon diamond” of Fig. 1. In the presence of two conflicting defeasible inferences (and
in the absence of other considerations such as specificity), the credulous approach would
have us commit to one or the other conclusion, whereas the skeptical approach would have
us withhold commitment.
In the literature, conceptual reasons have been offered to prefer the cautious approach,
or at least for giving it equal standing to the credulous one (see for instance [14] as a
general reference). However, a directly skeptical approach has only been developed in the
case of acyclic inheritance networks by Horty et al. [15]. All other approaches enforce
skepticism in a roundabout way, considering the intersection of all credulous extensions.
In particular, there are no available frameworks for default logic embodying the “cautious”
or “skeptical” approach in a direct manner.
This paper introduces a notion of “general extension” for default logic that tries to
capture some of the intuitions behind skepticism. Whereas conflicts with strict information
are handled in the usual manner (thereby retaining the fundamental desideratum of
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Fig. 1. The Nixon diamond.
nonmonotonicity), conflicts among defeasible rules are handled cautiously. This means,
among other things, that default rules need not be explicitly triggered in order to prevent
the conclusions of conflicting rules from being endorsed.
There are two major technical fall-outs of the adoption of the notion of general extension.
First, according to the present approach, every default theory turns out to have a general
extension. In this, default logic as based on general extensions differs from Reiter’s original
proposal [30] and is more in line with Łukaszewicz [18,19] and Brewka [6], both subsumed
by Delgrande et al. [7] (in fact, Delgrande et al. explicitly claim their approach to provide
an “amalgamation” of those of Łukaszewicz and Brewka [7, p. 198]). The basic intuition
behind general extensions is however quite different from these other proposals. (The last
section of the paper contains a comparison of default logic based on general extension to
some of the other approaches in the literature.)
The second technical fall-out is the identification of a well-behaved relation of
defeasible consequence for default theories. The abstract notion of a relation of defeasible
consequence first appears with Gabbay [12]. In fact, one could argue that the whole point
of having a nonmonotonic logic is to allow us to draw inferences, and this in turn requires
that we have a relation |∼ holding between sentences, such that ϕ |∼ψ roughly represents
the fact that ψ is a defeasible or nonmonotonic consequence of ϕ. Gabbay [12] identifies
certain principles that seem necessary for such a relation to be well-behaved, most notably
the following:
(1) Reflexivity: ϕ |∼ϕ;
(2) Stability or Cautious Monotonicity: ϕ |∼ψ, ϕ |∼χ
ϕ ∧ψ |∼χ ;
(3) Cut: ϕ |∼ψ, ϕ ∧ψ |∼χ
ϕ |∼χ .
As observed by Makinson [20] the principle of Cautious Monotonicity is the inverse of
Cut, a fact which is hidden in the case of classical logic in which Cautious Monotonicity
is subsumed by a more general principle of Weakening.
As borne out by the analysis of Makinson [20], there seems to be no natural way using
the notions of extension available in the literature to define a reasonably well-behaved (i.e.,
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satisfying the above three principles) relation of defeasible consequence for default logic
(skeptical or otherwise). The only plausible route appears to be the already mentioned
definition of a relation |∼ obtaining between a default theory and a proposition ϕ precisely
when ϕ is supported by all extensions of the theory. In other words, ϕ is defeasibly
inferable from a given default theory if it occurs in the intersection of all its extensions.
However, even discounting feasibility worries and other conceptual issues, there appears
to be a major problem with this approach. Makinson [20, p. 60] shows that defining |∼ as
the intersection of all the extension (in Reiter’s sense) of a default theory, one cannot satisfy
Cautious Monotonicity. This is a substantial drawback.
It is then significant that using general extensions, the relation |∼ defined as the
intersection of the extensions, turns out to have all three properties identified by D. Gabbay.
Moreover, in the important special case of semi-normal default theories, we have the
existence of a unique privileged extension of the theory (the least extension), which
makes the definition of |∼ particularly simple. Admittedly, this can have, at least in some
cases, some counter-intuitive consequences (see Section 4). While we argue that, once
the cautious motivation of the theory is properly taken into account, such consequences
are less counter-intuitive than it might appear at first, we also review alternative ways to
identify a privileged extension for a default theory in such a way as to obviate some of the
counter-intuitive consequences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we illustrate the notion of general
extension for the particularly simple, but already significative case of categorical (i.e.,
prerequisite-free) default theories. In Section 2 we take up several examples of categorical
theories. In Section 3 we introduce the notion of general extension for arbitrary
default theories, presenting some examples in Section 4. In Section 5 we show how to
define a relation of defeasible consequence having Gabbay’s three properties. Section 6
presents alternative developments including how to modify the definitions to overcome
a certain degree of counter-intuitiveness. Finally, in Section 7, we draw conclusions and
comparisons to other approaches. Appendix A contains proofs of selected theorems and
Appendix B sketches how to give a “transfinite” version of the present approach.
1. Categorical default theories
Fix a propositional language L, obtained from an infinite list of propositional variables
p,q, r, . . . by the propositional connectives ∧,∨,¬,→. The language L is endowed with
the usual (i.e., two-valued) semantics. In particular, we use |= to denote the usual relation of
logical consequence. If S and W are sets of propositional axioms from L and ϕ a formula
from L, then we write S |=W ϕ as shorthand for S ∪ W |= ϕ. A set S of sentences is
W -consistent if and only if S 6|=W p ∧¬p.
A default theory is a pair (W,∆), where W is a set of propositional axioms (a “world
description”) and ∆ is a finite set of defaults. In turn, a default δ is an expression of the
form
ζ : η
θ
,
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where ζ, η, θ are sentences from L. The intuitive meaning of a default δ is that if ζ has
been established, and ¬η has not been established, then assume θ (“by default”). The
expressions ζ, η, θ are called the pre-requisite, the justification, and the conclusion of δ,
respectively. If
δ = ζ : η
θ
,
then we put P(δ) = ζ , J (δ) = η, and C(δ) = θ . If Γ is a set of defaults, we will write
C(Γ ) for {C(δ): δ ∈ Γ }, and similarly for P(Γ ) and J (Γ ).
In the particular case in which a default δ has no pre-requisite (because it is of the form
: η
θ
or, equivalently, because P(δ) is a tautology), then we say that δ is categorical. If all
defaults in ∆ are categorical, then we say that (W,∆) is categorical. As we will see,
categorical default theories form a natural and well-behaved class. Other special cases: a
default δ is normal if J (δ) and C(δ) are logically equivalent, and it is semi-normal if J (δ)
logically implies C(δ) (typically, because J (δ) is a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is
C(δ)).
Definition 1.1. Let S be a set of L-sentences,W a world description, and δ a default. Then
we say:
(1) δ is admissible in S (relative to W ) if and only if S |=W P(δ);
(2) δ is conflicted in S (relative to W ) if and only if S |=W ¬C(δ);
(3) δ is pre-empted in S (relative to W ) if and only if S |=W ¬J (δ).
If Γ is a set of defaults, we say that δ is admissible, conflicted, or pre-empted in Γ
according as δ is admissible, pre-empted or conflicted in C(Γ ).
Reiter [30] defines the notion of an extension for a default theory. Intuitively, an
extension for a default theory (W,∆) is a deductively closed, consistent set of formulas
containingW and the consequents of a maximal subset of∆. Here we introduce the slightly
simpler notion of a classical extension for a default theory. Similar simplifications have
been advocated in [5,8,27].
Definition 1.2. A set Γ of defaults is a classical extension for (W,∆) if and only if it
satisfies Γ =⋃n>0 Γn, where Γ0 = ∅, and
Γn+1 =
{
δ ∈∆: C(Γn) |=W P(δ)&C(Γ ) 6|=W ¬J (δ)
};
(notice the occurrence of Γ in the definition of Γn+1). In other words, Γn+1 is the set of
defaults admissible in Γn that are not pre-empted in Γ .
Observe that if Γ is a classical extension for (W,∆) then {ϕ: C(Γ ) |=W ϕ} is an
extension in Reiter’s sense. In general, a default theory might have zero, one, or more
than one extension.
We record here the following well-known facts about classical extensions.
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Theorem 1.3. Let Γ be a classical extension for (W,∆).
(1) C(Γ ) is W -inconsistent if and only if W is inconsistent.
(2) If δ is admissible in Γ , but neither conflicted nor pre-empted in Γ , then δ ∈ Γ .
We now proceed to generalize this notion of extension, beginning with the somewhat
simpler particular case of categorical theories.
Let (W,∆) be a categorical default theory. Recall that this means that the defaults in ∆
have no pre-requisite. In the general case of a default theory, extensions have to be defined
in the somewhat peculiar form of Definition 1.2, since extensions have to be “grounded”,
where a classical extension Γ is grounded if it is a minimal set of defaults admissible but
not pre-empted in Γ . Definition 1.2 is formulated in such a way as to enforce this form of
minimality by letting no more defaults become admissible than “have to”. When a theory
is categorical groundedness is no longer a concern, and it is immediate to check that Γ is
a classical extension for a categorical theory (W,∆) if and only if it is a solution to the
following fixpoint equation:
Γ = {δ ∈∆: C(Γ ) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
In other words, Γ contains all and only those defaults that are not pre-empted in Γ . We
now set out to generalize this notion.
Definition 1.4. A general extension for a categorical default theory (W,∆) is a pair
(Γ +,Γ −) of disjoint sets of defaults from ∆, simultaneously satisfying the following two
fixpoint equations:
Γ + = {δ: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&C(∆− Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ)};
Γ − = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ)}.
In other words, Γ + is the set of all defaults that are neither conflicted in Γ + nor pre-empted
in (∆− Γ −), while Γ − is the set of all defaults that are either conflicted or pre-empted in
Γ +.
Observe that the components Γ + and Γ − of the extension are required to be disjoint.
This corresponds to the intuition that Γ + is the set of the (definitely) triggered defaults and
Γ − is the set of the (definitely) excluded defaults, and that no default can be both explicitly
triggered and explicitly ruled out. From a purely technical point of view, it is possible to
develop the theory without such a disjointness requirement, and this would correspond to
a “four-valued” intuition such as that of Belnap [4]. We do not purse this possibility here.
In the next two theorems we show that general extensions indeed generalize the notion
of classical extension, and that general extensions always exist. Proofs are given in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1.5. Let Γ + be a classical extension for a categorical default theory (W,∆),
and put
Γ − = {δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +},
then (Γ +,Γ −) is a general extension for (W,∆).
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Theorem 1.6. Every categorical default theory has a general extension.
As mentioned, a full proof of the theorem can be found in the Appendix A. It is,
however, interesting intuitively to characterize the process by which such an extension can
be obtained. A general extension (Γ +,Γ −) can be constructed “from below” in stages,
as the limit of the sequences Γ +n and Γ −n (for n > 0). For the starting point, we put
Γ +0 = Γ −0 = ∅.
For the inductive step, let Γ +n+1 be a maximal set of defaults from ∆ such that: (i) the
conclusions of defaults in Γ +n ∪Γ +n+1 form a consistent set; and (ii) no default δ ∈ Γ +n+1 is
pre-empted in ∆− Γ −n . (Observe that such a maximal subset need not be unique, so that
the process is not deterministic—this will be important for the definition of the relation
|∼.) Also put
Γ −n+1 =
{
δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +n+1
}
.
The sequences are increasing and disjoint, and their limit gives a general extension.
The existence of extensions is a desirable feature that is missing in Reiter’s original for-
mulation, but that can be found for instance in all three proposals of Łukaszewicz [18,19],
Brewka [6], and Delgrande et al. [7]. But as the examples discussed in the following section
will make clear, the intuitions at the basis of these proposals are different from the present
one, and the formal mathematical properties of the frameworks correspondingly different.
2. Examples
In this section we take up a few examples in order to compare the notion of general
extension given here to other notions available in the literature. As before, “classical
extension” here refers to the notion of extension in the sense of Reiter [30], as simplified
in Definition 1.2.
Example 2.1. Consider first the default theory (W,∆), where W is empty and ∆
comprises the two defaults:
: p
¬q and
: q
¬p .
As is well known, this theory has two classical extensions, according to which default is
triggered. In addition to these, the theory has one general extension, in which no default is
triggered, and none is ruled out.
Example 2.2. Consider the default theory in whichW is empty, and∆ comprises only the
default
: p
¬p .
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This theory has no classical extensions, but it has one general extension, namely, (∅,∅),
in which the default is neither triggered nor ruled out.
Example 2.3. Consider now the theory where W is empty, but ∆ comprises the defaults
: p
¬p and
: q
r
.
As before this theory has no classical extensions, because of the first default. It does
have one general extension, namely( : q
r
,∅
)
.
The first default cannot be triggered, but there is no obstacle that prevents triggering the
second.
Example 2.4. Consider a different sort of theory, in which W is empty and ∆ =
{δ1, . . . , δn}, for some n > 1. Suppose also that for all k such that 16 k < n,
δk = : pk¬pk+1 ,
whereas
δn = : pn¬p1 .
So defaults are organized in a “loop”, in which the conclusion of each one of them pre-
empts the next default, and the conclusion of the last one pre-empts the first. It is easy to
check that this theory has no classical extensions if n is odd. (It has, of course one general
extension even when n is odd, namely (∅,∅).) On the other hand, if n is even, say n= 2m,
beside the general extension (∅,∅), there are two classical extensions, namely({δ2k+1: 06 k <m}, {δ2k+2: 06 k <m}),
and the one with the two components switched around,({δ2k+2: 06 k <m}, {δ2k+1: 06 k <m}).
Indeed, this result is consistent with similar results in [1,27].
So far we have only been concerned with existence of extensions, but this is by no
means the only question that can be asked when a notion of extension is proposed. In
the remaining part of this section we take up a few “benchmark” examples, mostly drawn
from [7], in order to assess the behavior of the proposed notion.
Example 2.5 (Semi-monotonicity). Consider the default theory (W1,∆1), where W1 = ∅,
and ∆1 comprises:
: p ∧¬q
p
.
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Theory (W2,∆2) is obtained by putting W2 =W1, and by adding to ∆1 the default
: q
q
.
Semi-monotonicity is a property first singled out by Reiter. According to this property
the extensions of a theory increase monotonically with the size of ∆: if Γ is an extension
for (W,∆) and ∆⊆∆′, then there is an extension Γ ′ for (W,∆′) such that Γ ⊆ Γ ′.
By considering the above example, we see that semi-monotonicity fails for the notion of
general extension of Section 3. The theory (W1,∆1) has one general extension, triggering
its unique default. When the second default is thrown in, however, we lose the first one,
in the sense that the unique extension of the theory triggers the second default and rules
out the first (the first default is now potentially pre-empted). In this, the version of default
logic presented here agrees with Reiter’s Default Logic; by contrast, Constrained Default
Logic [7] is semi-monotonic.
Semi-monotonicity is regarded as a desirable property, because it is a form of locality:
extensions for large theories can be approximated by forming extensions for smaller ones.
Reiter’s Default Logic is semi-monotonic in the case of normal theories, in which case
we can apply the approximating process just mentioned. Although general extensions fail
to give a semi-monotonic framework for default logic, they still allow us to construct
extensions “from below”, although in a different sense. Moreover, in the case of semi-
normal theories, as we will see, the extension thus obtained is unique.
Example 2.6 (Weak orthogonality of extensions). Consider the default theory with W = ∅
and ∆ comprising the defaults:
: p ∧¬q
¬q and
: ¬p ∧ q
¬p .
Orthogonality is the property that any two distinct extensions are inconsistent. Delgrande
et al. [7] propose a similar notion, more appropriate in the context of Constrained Default
Logic, i.e., Weak Orthogonality: this is the property according to which any two sets of
constraints corresponding to distinct extensions are inconsistent.
Although weak orthogonality seems an appropriate feature in the case of the family of
logics inspired by “commitment to the assumptions” (such as [6,7,18,19]), it appears to be
less so in the present context. Indeed, it is possible to argue that (weak) orthogonality, or
even maximality of extensions is not a desirable feature given the “three-valued” intuition
at the basis of the notion of general extension. In fact, orthogonality fails for general
extensions, for the above theory has two maximal (mutually inconsistent) extensions,
whose intersection is however again an extension.
Example 2.7 (Commitment to assumptions). This is the “broken arms” example of
Poole [28]. Consider the theory (W,∆) where W = {¬q ∨ ¬s}, and ∆ comprises the
defaults:
: p ∧ q
p
and
: r ∧ s
r
.
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Here the intuitive interpretation is as follows: we are told that either the left arm is broken
or the right arm is broken (¬q ∨ ¬s); the first default asserts that a person’s left arm is
usable (p) unless it is broken (¬q), while the second default asserts that a person’s right
arm is usable (r) unless it is broken (¬s).
Reiter’s notion of extension here gives that both arms are usable, although we are told
that at least one is broken. There is in fact a unique extension in Reiter’s sense in which
both defaults are fired, the justification of each one of them being consistent both with what
is known and with the conclusions of fired defaults. The situation is essentially the same
with the notion of general extension.
As Delgrande et al. [7] point out, the problem here is that the consistency of each
justification is tested individually, and not—as it were—wholesale. Indeed, this provides
motivation for the adoption of the second construal of prerequisites we mentioned, i.e., as
working hypotheses rather than mere consistency conditions. However, if we do adopt the
first (an equally viable option, as Delgrande et al. [7] admit), then this example loses much
of its intuitive punch.
3. Grounded extensions
In this section we show how to generalize the results of the previous section to default
theories that might not be categorical. The treatment in this section will reveal that pre-
requisites play an unexpectedly subtle role, in more than one way. It will also turn out
that the definitions and theorems in this section are somewhat more complicated than
their analogues relative to categorical default theories. Accordingly, to simplify matters
somewhat, and we no loss in generality, we restrict our attention to default theories (W,∆)
for which W is propositionally consistent.
Definition 3.1. Let (W,∆) be a default theory and Γ ⊆ ∆. Then Ad(Γ ) is the set of
defaults (from ∆) that are admissible in Γ :
Ad(Γ )= {δ: C(Γ ) |=W P(δ)}.
We are going to be particularly interested in sets Γ of defaults such that Γ ⊆ Ad(Γ ), i.e.,
every δ ∈ Γ is admissible in Γ . Recall that classical extension for arbitrary default theories
are required to be grounded. We now isolate and justify this notion of groundedness.
Definition 3.2. A set Θ of defaults is grounded if and only if Θ = ⋃n>0Θn, where
Θ0 = ∅, and
Θn+1 =
{
δ ∈Θ: C(Θn) |=W P(δ)
}
.
I.e., Θn+1 is the set of all defaults from Θ that are admissible in Θn.
It is clear that if Γ is grounded then Γ ⊆ Ad(Γ ). Notice that for any default theory
(W,∆) there will be several grounded sets Θ ⊆∆. But just because Θ is grounded does
not mean that it is a set of defaults that we need to accept (that are triggered in some
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extension): groundedness provides only a (weak) necessary condition: classical extensions
are grounded in the above sense (proof in Appendix A).
Theorem 3.3. Let Γ be a classical extension for a default theory (W,∆); then Γ is
grounded.
We are now ready to give the definition of general extensions for arbitrary default
theories. We will identify such extensions with triples (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) of sets of defaults,
in which Γ + is the set of defaults explicitly triggered, Γ − is the set of defaults explicitly
conflicted in Γ + or pre-empted in Γ +, and Γ ∗ (the set of “potentially admissible” defaults)
expresses the degree of caution of the extension. In general, the larger Γ ∗, the smaller
Γ +, so that the size of Γ ∗ is proportional to the caution of Γ + and hence it is inversely
related to its credulousness. In the formal development, as we will see (Theorem 3.8), this
is reflected in the fact that general extensions can be obtained by an iterative process which
is monotonic in Γ + and Γ −, but anti-monotonic in Γ ∗.
Definition 3.4. A general extension for a default theory (W,∆) is a triple (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗)
of sets of defaults from ∆, such that:
• Γ + and Γ − are disjoint;
• the following two fixpoint equations are simultaneously satisfied:
Γ + = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W P(δ)&C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&
C
(
Γ ∗ − Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ)};
Γ − = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ)};
• Ad(Γ +)⊆ Γ ∗ ⊆ {δ: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬P(δ)}.
In words: Γ + is the set of all defaults admissible in Γ + but neither conflicted in Γ + nor
pre-empted in (Γ ∗ − Γ −); Γ − is the set of all defaults either conflicted or pre-empted in
Γ +; and Γ ∗ is a set of defaults containing all default admissible in Γ + and only defaults
whose pre-requisites are consistent with C(Γ +) (the latter condition is intended to capture
the fact that δ is “potentially” admissible in Γ +).
From the definition it follows immediately that if (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is a general extension,
every default δ in Γ + is admissible in Γ +, i.e., Γ + ⊆ Ad(Γ +). Recall that we restricted out
attention to default theories (W,∆)withW propositionally consistent: we can see now that
nothing is lost by that assumption, for if W is propositionally inconsistent, then (∅,∆,∅)
is the only extension of the theory. The following theorem shows that this definition of
general extension coincides with Definition 1.4 in the case of categorical theories.
Theorem 3.5. Let (W,∆) be a categorical default theory and (Γ +,Γ −) an extension in
the sense of Definition 1.4. Then (Γ +,Γ −,∆) is an extension in the sense of Definition 3.4.
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We are going to be interested in extensions that are minimal according to the ordering
defined below.
Definition 3.6. Let (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) and (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗) be 3-tuples of sets of defaults.
Define an ordering by putting (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗)6 (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗) iff:
Γ + ⊆Θ+ and Γ − ⊆Θ− and Θ∗ ⊆ Γ ∗.
We now state the analogues of Theorems 1.5 and 1.6 (proofs in Appendix A).
Theorem 3.7. Let Γ + =⋃n>0 Γ +n be a classical extension for a default theory (W,∆).
Put:
Γ − = {δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +};
Γ ∗ = {δ: δ admissible in Γ +}= Ad(Γ +).
Then (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is a general extension for (W,∆).
Theorem 3.8. Let (W,∆) be a default theory. Then:
(i) every default theory has an iteratively definable general extension;
(ii) such an extension is 6-minimal; and
(iii) any minimal extension for (W,∆) is grounded.
Theorem 3.9. Let (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) be a 6-minimal extension for a default theory (W,∆).
Then (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) can be obtained as the limit of an inductive construction of the kind
given in the proof of Theorem 3.8.
4. Examples, continued
Example 4.1 (Cumulativity). Consider the theory (W,∆), whereW = ∅ and∆ comprises
the two defaults:
δ1 = : p
p
and δ2 = p ∨ q : ¬p¬p .
Cumulativity is the property that if a default is triggered in all the extensions of a theory,
adding that default’s conclusion to the world description W should give a theory that
has the same extensions as the original one. This is related to the property of cautious
monotonicity (if a “theorem” is added back to the set of facts from which it was deduced,
then the set of “theorems” should not change), but it is not equivalent to it, as we will see.
In the above example, using Reiter’s notion of extension, cumulativity fails: the above
theory has one extension Γ triggering the first default, therefore C(Γ ) |=W p ∨ q ; but
the second default cannot be triggered because pre-empted. Now consider the theory
(W ∪ {p ∨ q},∆). This modified theory gains an extension, in which the second default
rather than the first is triggered.
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Let us see what happens with general extensions. The theory (W,∆) has two general
extensions: a minimal one, (∅,∅,∆) and a nonminimal one, (δ1, δ2, δ2), in which δ1 is
triggered and δ2 ruled out.
When we add p ∨ q back into the world description W , we obtain a new extension,
(δ2, δ1, δ1), triggering the second default and ruling out the first. Therefore, cumulativity
fails also for the notion of general extension. Notice that this counterexample to
cumulativity is also exactly the counterexample used by Makinson [20] to establish that
defeasible consequence defined as intersection of classical extensions is not cautiously
monotonic. We will see, however, that this does not preclude Cautious Monotonicity from
holding when defeasible consequence is defined as intersection of general extensions, since
adding the “theorem” p∨q back into the world descriptionW gives new extensions, but no
new minimal ones. In particular, although the new theory has more extensions than the old
one, the intersection of the extensions (i.e., the set defaults triggered in every extension) is
the same.
It is worth noting here that Brewka’s Cumulative Default Logic is, of course, cumulative,
whereas for Delgrande’s et al. Constrained Default Logic cumulativity fails except in the
categorical (prerequisite-free) case.
Example 4.2. Consider a default theory (W,∆), where W is empty and ∆ comprises the
two defaults
δ1 = : p
p
and δ2 = q : ¬p¬p .
This example is particularly interesting, since it highlights the intuitions behind the
present approach and the extent to which it delivers counter-intuitive results. The point is
that in the (unique) minimal extension of (W,∆), neither default is triggered and neither is
ruled out. This is due to the basic “skeptical” intuition behind general extensions: defaults
that are potentially pre-empted are not triggered. In the minimal extension, δ1 is potentially
pre-empted by ¬p (the conclusion of δ2), and δ2 is potentially pre-empted by p (the
conclusion of δ1). The way things are set up, it does not matter that there is no way δ2
will ever be triggered, since its pre-requisite q is not entailed by the conclusions of any of
the defaults in ∆.
To some extent this state of affairs is unsatisfying: since δ2 cannot possibly be triggered,
it should not be allowed to prevent the triggering of δ1. Let us notice that there seems
to be different intuitions at work here: on the one hand there is the idea that “potentially
pre-empted” defaults should not be triggered, on the other hand there is the intuition that
defaults that are not even potentially admissible should be ruled out. In some cases, such
as the present one, these intuitions appear to be in conflict.
Notice that the theory also has a nonminimal extension that avoids the problem by
triggering δ1 and (consequently) ruling out δ2. For the time being, this is where we are
going to leave the matter. We will come back to this question in Section 6, and indicate
alternative ways in which this problem can be solved.
Example 4.3. Consider the default theory (W,∆) with W = {p} and ∆ comprising the
following defaults:
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δ1 = p : q
q
,
δ2 = q : q
r
,
δ3 = q : q¬r ,
δ4 = : ¬q
s
,
δ5 = : ¬s
t
.
This example is tended to highlight features of general extensions that are not brought
out by the previous examples. Let us consider the different defaults. Default δ1 is always
triggered: its pre-requisite is entailed byW , and it cannot be pre-empted since the negation
of its justification q is not entailed by the conclusions of any of the defaults. Things are
different for the pair of defaults δ2 and δ3: once δ1 is triggered, they are both admissible,
and neither is (potentially) pre-empted. However, they cannot both be triggered since they
have contradictory conclusions. This state of affairs is a “diamond”, analogous to the one
of Fig. 1. At the diamond, extensions split. Finally consider the two defaults δ4 and δ5:
the latter cannot be triggered initially, because potentially pre-empted by δ4. However,
as soon as δ1 is triggered, δ4 is ruled out (because pre-empted), removing any obstacles
to the triggering of δ5. In conclusion, the theory (W,∆) has two minimal extensions,
one extension triggering δ1, δ2, and δ5; and the other extension triggering δ1, δ3, and
δ5. In the first extension δ3 and δ4 are ruled out and in the second δ2 and δ4 are ruled
out.
5. Defeasible consequence
First, it will be convenient to introduce an abbreviated notation for extensions: we
will use boldface uppercase Greek letters to stand for triples of sets of defaults, as in
Γ = (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗). Similarly, given sequences of sets of defaults Γ +n , Γ −n , and Γ ∗n , we
write Γ n for (Γ +n ,Γ −n ,Γ ∗n ). If Γ n is a sequence of sets of defaults (n> 0), we write limΓ n
for the unique Γ = (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) such that:
Γ + =
⋃
n>0
Γ +n , Γ − =
⋃
n>0
Γ −n , Γ ∗ =
⋂
n>0
Γ ∗n .
Finally, to simplify notation still further we write just W + ϕ in place of W ∪ {ϕ}.
Now we take up a property of general extensions closely related to cumulativity.
Appendix A contains a proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let (W,∆) be a default theory, and suppose Γ is a 3-tuple of subsets of ∆
such that C(Γ +) |=W ϕ. Then Γ is a general extension for (W,∆), if and only if it is a
general extension for (W + ϕ,∆).
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The above result shows that any extension (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) remains such when we adjoin
one of its consequences to the world description. This by itself does not tell us anything
about extensions other than (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗). In particular, it does not establish cumulativity.
Recall that cumulativity is the property that if ϕ is supported in every extension of a
default theory (W,∆), then the theory (W + ϕ,∆) has the same extensions as (W,∆).
Cumulativity fails for general extensions just as for classical extensions (see Example 4.1).
But this, as we will see, still allows us to define a cautiously monotonic relation of
defeasible consequence based on general extensions. It is perhaps worth recalling that
Example 4.1 is precisely Makinson’s counterexample to cautious monotony for defeasible
consequence based on classical extensions.
We also record here that Cumulativity fails for Constrained Default Logic, which
is, on the other hand, both Semi-monotonic and Orthogonal. A comparison of General
Extensions and Constrained Default Logic is summarized in Fig. 2.
For the purposes of this section, in the light of the characterization of minimal extensions
given in Theorem 3.9, we refer to a sequence Γ n as a construction sequence for a theory
(W,∆), if the following conditions are met:
(1) Γ +0 = Γ −0 = ∅;
(2) Γ ∗0 is the set of all defaults from ∆ whose pre-requisite is W -consistent;
(3) Γ +n+1 is a maximal set of defaults such that:
(a) C(Γ +n ∪ Γ +n+1) is consistent;
(b) every δ ∈ Γ +n+1 is admissible in Γ +n ;
(c) no default δ ∈ Γ +n+1 is pre-empted in Γ ∗n −Γ −n ;
(4) Γ −n+1 = {δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +n+1};
(5) Γ ∗n+1 = {δ: C(Γ +n+1) 6|=W ¬P(δ)}.
Definition 5.2. Let (W,∆) be a default theory. Then for any sentence ϕ, we say that ϕ
is a defeasible consequence of (W,∆), written (W,∆) |∼ϕ, if and only if C(Γ +) |=W ϕ,
whenever Γ is a 6-minimal extension of (W,∆).
So we define |∼ skeptically by taking the intersection of all (minimal) extensions of the
theory, i.e., all extensions that can be obtained by an inductive process of the same kind of
the one given in the proof of Theorem 3.8. The following then is an immediate consequence
of the definitions and Theorem 3.8.
Theorem 5.3. If (W,∆) |∼ϕ, then for every construction sequence Γ 0,Γ 1, . . . there is n
such that C(Γ +n ) |=W ϕ.
Cumulative Semi-monotonic Orthogonal Cautiously monotonic
Gen Ext No No No Yes
ConDL No Yes Yes ?
Fig. 2. Comparison of General Extensions and Constrained Default Logic.
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We need to verify that |∼ is indeed a well-behaved notion of defeasible consequence, in
that it satisfies the conditions of Reflexivity, Stability, and Cut. However, such properties
were formulated for a relation |∼ that holds between sentences, whereas the relation defined
above holds between a default theory and a sentence. Accordingly, we need to reformulate
such properties in order to take this fact into account.
(1) Reflexivity: if ϕ ∈W then (W,∆) |∼ϕ;
(2) Stability or Cautious Monotonicity: (W,∆) |∼ϕ, (W,∆) |∼ψ
(W + ϕ,∆) |∼ψ ;
(3) Cut: (W,∆) |∼ϕ, (W + ϕ,∆) |∼ψ
(W,∆) |∼ψ .
Theorem 5.4. Suppose (W,∆) |∼ϕ and let Γ = limΓ n be a minimal extension for
(W + ϕ,∆). Then there is a minimal extension Θ = limΘn for (W,∆) such that Γ 6Θ .
This theorem shows that although minimal extensions for (W,∆) start out more slowly
than extensions for (W + ϕ,∆), they eventually “catch up”. Of course, the proof of
Theorem 5.4 depends crucially on the minimality of Γ .
Theorem 5.5. Suppose (W,∆) |∼ϕ and let Γ = limΓ n be a minimal extension for
(W + ϕ,∆). Then there is a minimal extension Θ = limΘn for (W,∆) such that Θ 6 Γ .
Theorem 5.5 is the converse of the previous Theorem 5.4 and, in a sense, the crucial
result in the paper. Theorem 5.5 is what is needed to establish Cautious Monotonicity for
|∼ and, characteristically, this is where the mathematics itself becomes interesting. The
reader is referred to the Appendix A for the proof: here we only note that in a somewhat
unexpected twist, the proof of Theorem 5.5 makes use of Theorem 5.4.
Notice that if (W,∆) |∼ϕ then (by the two theorems above) every minimal extension Γ
for (W + ϕ) is between two minimal extensions Θ and Π for (W,∆), i.e., Θ 6 Γ 6Π.
By minimality we have Θ = Γ = Π, so Γ is an extension for (W,∆). This shows that
every minimal extension for (W + ϕ,∆) is a minimal extension for (W,∆).
The converse also holds: let Γ be a minimal extension for (W,∆). Then, by
Theorem 5.1, Γ is an extension for (W + ϕ,∆): we need to see that it is minimal. If
not, then there is an extension Θ for (W + ϕ,∆) that is properly below Γ : Θ < Γ . By
Theorem 5.5 there is an extension Π for (W,∆) such that Π 6Θ . By transitivity, we get
Π < Γ , contradicting the hypothesis that Γ is a minimal extension for (W,∆). This shows
that every minimal extension for (W,∆) is also a minimal extension for (W +ϕ,∆). Thus
we have established the following:
Theorem 5.6. Suppose (W,∆) |∼ϕ. Then (W,∆) and (W + ϕ,∆) have exactly the same
minimal extensions.
It is now clear why failure of cumulativity does not preclude the relation of defeasible
consequence (as based on general extensions) from being cautiously monotonic: by adding
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the “theorem” ϕ back into the world descriptionW we do get new extensions, but such new
extensions are not minimal. This fact is exploited in the proof of Theorem 5.7 below.
Theorem 5.7. The relation |∼ satisfies the properties of Cut, Reflexivity, and Stability.
6. Alternative developments
In this section we consider alternative developments of the theory of the foregoing pages.
First, we take up the case of semi-normal default theories. Such theories are shown to have
a unique minimal extension, so that defeasible consequence appears to have a particularly
simple definition for semi-normal default theories. Second, we identify certain particular,
“optimal”, extensions of semi-normal default theories and argue that in some cases they
might provide more intuitive results, especially in the light of Example 4.2. It is not clear,
however, that optimal extension can still give rise to a cautiously monotonic notion of
defeasible consequence. Finally, we identify a variant of the notion of general extension
that, although slightly more complicated than the one of Section 3, seems also to take care
of the problematic case of Example 4.2.
6.1. Semi-normal theories
Recall that a default is semi-normal if its justification implies the conclusion, e.g.,
because it contains the conclusion as a conjunct. A theory all of whose defaults are semi-
normal is also called semi-normal. Semi-normal default theories form a natural and well-
behaved class. They were first introduced by Reiter and Criscuolo [31] to handle conflicts
among defaults and to block certain unwanted instances of transitivity of implication. In
this sense, they seem sufficient for most purposes in knowledge representation. However,
with Reiter’s notion of extension, and in contrast to the class of normal default theories,
semi-normal default theories might fail to have an extension. It then becomes interesting to
notice that using the notion of general extension not only are these theories guaranteed
to have an extension (as they are with many other notions of extension), but they are
guaranteed to have a uniquely minimal one.
Theorem 6.1. Every semi-normal default theory has a unique minimal extension.
The reader is referred to Appendix A for a complete proof, but it is worth noting here
the basic conceptual fact that the proof exploits. We have seen that the proof of the fact
that every default theory has a general extension proceeds by a genuine inductive process.
However, such a process is nondeterministic. In particular, in the categorical case, we begin
by putting Γ +0 = Γ −0 = ∅, and for the inductive step we choose as Γ +n+1 a maximal set of
defaults all having the following properties: (i) the conclusions of defaults in Γ +n ∪ Γ +n+1
form a consistent set; and (ii) no default in Γ +n+1 is pre-empted in ∆− Γ −n (the other set
Γ −n+1 is determined by the choice of Γ
+
n+1).
But now we are dealing with a semi-normal default theory. In particular, no semi-normal
default can be conflicted (relative to any set of defaults) without being already pre-empted
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(relative to that set of defaults). It follows that the above nondeterministic definition can
be replaced by a deterministic one, letting Γ +n+1 be the set of all defaults that are not
pre-empted in ∆ − Γ −n . By the previous remark, this ensures consistency of the set of
conclusions as well.
This appears to vindicate the view, put forward by Horty et al. [15], that a cautious theory
of defeasible inheritance should be directly skeptical, by defining the set of skeptically
acceptable conclusions in a direct way, and not via detour through the intersection of all
credulous extensions. Such a view has been challenged by Makinson and Schlechta [21],
but now it appears that at least in the case of semi-normal default theories such a directly
skeptical approach is indeed viable. In fact, in the case of a default theory (W,∆) having a
least extension (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗), we have that for any ϕ,
(W,∆) |∼ϕ ⇐⇒ C(Γ +) |=W ϕ.
Then the set of the skeptically acceptable conclusions warranted by (W,∆) can be obtained
by simply giving the (deterministic) inductive process of the proof of Theorem 3.8, as
amended in Theorem 6.1.
Moreover, it is possible to piggy-back a relation of defeasible consequence for arbitrary
default theories on the relation |∼ defined above, restricted to semi-normal ones. In other
words, for each set ∆ of defaults let SN(∆) the result of replacing each default
α : β
γ
by
α : β ∧ γ
γ
.
Then one could define for an arbitrary default theory (W,∆), (W,∆) |∼SN ϕ iff(
W,SN(∆)
) |∼ϕ.
Indeed, the switch from a default theory to its semi-normalized version is a natural and
well-motivated move (see Reiter and Criscuolo [31] or Delgrande et al.—in fact, the latter
argue that it is reasonable to replace arbitrary defaults by categorical, semi-normal ones [7,
p. 193]).
6.2. Optimal extensions
We noticed, in discussing Example 4.2, that some of the problems with the minimal
extension of the theory discussed there could be obviated by stepping up to a nonminimal
extension. The problem, of course, is that in general there will be several nonminimal
extensions to choose from, and there seems to be no principled way to single one out as
privileged.
It turns out that this problem has a solution in the case of semi-normal default theories,
for which we can identify, following Manna and Shamir [22], certain extensions as the
“optimal” fixpoints of a certain monotonic operator. We begin by introducing such an
operator, along with the necessary auxiliary notions. In this section, given a default theory
(W,∆) we refer to arbitrary triples Γ = (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) of subsets of ∆ as pseudo-
extensions. If a pseudo-extension Γ satisfies the additional condition that Γ + and Γ −
are disjoint, and Γ + ⊆ Γ ∗, then it is called a potential extension. Moreover, as we
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did also elsewhere in the paper, we assume that the background world-description W is
consistent—otherwise, there is only one extension (∅,∆,∅).
Definition 6.2. Given a semi-normal default theory (W,∆), define an operator τ over the
class of pseudo-extensions for (W,∆) by putting τ (Γ )=Θ , where:
Θ+ = {δ: δ is admissible in Γ + and
δ is not pre-empted in Γ ∗ − Γ − relative to W };
Θ− = {δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Θ+ relative to W };
Θ∗ = {δ: P(δ) is consistent with C(Θ+) relative to W }.
It is immediate to verify that τ is a monotone operator over the class of the pseudo-
extensions, i.e., if Γ 6Θ then τ (Γ ) 6 τ (Θ). We are going to be interested in the fixed-
points of τ , i.e., pseudo-extensionsΘ such that τ (Θ)=Θ . Of course, these fixed-points
need not be extensions in the usual sense: τ will have many fixed points Θ in which Θ+
and Θ− will not be disjoint, or in which Θ+ is not a subset of Θ∗ −Θ−.
This is where Manna and Shamir [22] come to the rescue. Following their terminology,
say that a collection C of pseudo-extensions is 6-consistent if and only if any two pseudo-
extensions in C have an upper bound in C: i.e., if Γ and Θ are in C then there is a pseudo-
extensionΠ such that both Γ 6Π and Θ 6Π.
Now let PE be the set of all potential extensions for (W,∆). It is then possible to verify
that:
(C1) Any 6-consistent subset of PE has a least upper bound in PE .
(C2) Any nonempty subset of PE has a greatest lower bound in PE .
Definition 6.3. Let Γ be a fixed point of τ . Then Γ is called intrinsic if for any other fixed
pointΘ of τ , the set {Γ ,Θ} is 6-consistent. The largest intrinsic fixed point of τ is called
optimal. (See [22, p. 419].)
Theorem 6.4. Let (W,∆) be a default theory, and PE the collection of all potential
extensions for (W,∆). Then PE contains an optimal fixed point of τ .
This is just an application of Theorem 3 of Manna and Shamir [22, p. 417] using
conditions (C1) and (C2).
Theorem 6.5. Let (W,∆) be a semi-normal theory, and suppose Γ is a potential extension
that is also a fixed point of τ . Then Γ is a general extension for (W,∆).
It follows from the theorem that every semi-normal default theory has a unique “optimal”
extension. It is easy to check that the nonminimal extension of the theory of Example 4.2
is also the unique optimal extension. It appears then that optimal extensions, at least in the
case of semi-normal default theories provide a viable alternative to minimal extensions,
an alternative, moreover, that seems capable of avoiding any residual degree of counter-
intuitiveness of minimal extensions.
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It is immediate to use optimal extensions to define a relation of defeasible consequence:
just say that (W,∆) |∼ϕ if and only if C(Γ +) |=W ϕ, where Γ is the optimal extension
of (W,∆). However, we do not know at this stage if optimal extensions can support a
relation of defeasible consequence that also satisfies Cautious Monotonicity. The crucial
role played by minimality in establishing Cautious Monotonicity when |∼ is defined using
minimal extensions makes it at least not obvious that this property carries over to optimal
extensions.
6.3. “New twist” extensions
The problematic case given in Example 4.2 suggests a variant of our notion of extension.
Recall that the problem with Example 4.2 appeared to be that we allowed defaults in Γ ∗
even though they were not even potentially admissible, in that their pre-requisite was not
a logical consequence of conclusions of defaults in ∆. Now, as we remarked, this is in
keeping with the intuition that potentially pre-empted defaults should not be triggered,
independently of whether the pre-empting defaults are themselves potentially admissible.
However, the further intuition that defaults that are not even potentially admissible
should be ruled out can be incorporated in a rather straightforward way into our definition
of extension. This has the cost of complicating the proofs somewhat, but appears at the
same time to take care of whatever residual degree of counter-intuitiveness the notion
of extension might have. Below we consider general extensions with this “new twist”,
appropriately referred to as “NT-extensions”.
Definition 6.6. An NT-extension for a default theory (W,∆) is a triple (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) of
sets of defaults from ∆, such that:
• Γ + and Γ − are disjoint;
• the following two fixpoint equations are simultaneously satisfied:
Γ + = {δ: δ admissible in Γ + & δ not conflicted in Γ + &
δ not pre-empted in Γ ∗ −Γ −};
Γ − = {δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +}∪{
δ: ¬P(δ) is W -consistent with C(Γ ∗ − Γ −)};
• Ad(Γ +)⊆ Γ ∗ ⊆ {δ: P(δ) is W -consistent with C(Γ +)}.
Thus, Γ + is the set of all defaults admissible in Γ + but neither conflicted in Γ + nor pre-
empted in (Γ ∗ − Γ −). On the other hand, Γ − is the set of all defaults either (i) conflicted
or pre-empted in Γ + or (ii) whose pre-requisite is not implied by the potentially triggered
defaults. Finally, Γ ∗ is a set of defaults containing all default admissible in Γ + and whose
pre-requisite is consistent with C(Γ +).
It is now upon us to show that the theory of general extension carries over to NT-
extensions. However, there is no obstacle to doing so, except perhaps the cost of the
added complication in proofs resulting from the “new twist”. As evidence of this, we
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give the extension-existence theorem for NT-extensions, whose proof can be found in the
Appendix A.
Theorem 6.7. Let (W,∆) be a default theory. Then there is an iteratively definable NT-
extension Θ for (W,∆).
To see how this works, let us take up again Example 4.2. Recall that we had a default
theory (W,∆) with W empty and ∆ comprising the defaults:
δ1 = : p
p
and δ2 = q : ¬p¬p .
Since C(∆) 6|=W q , the default δ2 is not even potentially admissible in ∆ and therefore not
even potentially admissible in any Θ∗ ⊆ ∆. It follows that if Θ is an NT-extension for
the theory, then δ2 ∈ Θ−. Thus, δ1 is no longer pre-empted in Θ∗ − Θ−, and therefore
δ1 ∈ Θ+, as one would expect. Indeed, it is easy to see that (δ1, δ2, δ1) is the only
NT-extension of the theory. However, as we know, it is not the only general extension.
Therefore it appears that the net effect of switching to NT-extensions is to eliminate
some of the minimal extensions. In this sense, this solution to the problem presented by
Example 4.2 is analogous to the one in which one steps up to a nonminimal (e.g., optimal)
general extension.
7. Conclusions and comparisons
As we have seen, the present approach has two main technical fallouts, namely the fact
that extensions are always guaranteed to exist and the fact that general extensions allow for
the definition of a well-behaved relation of defeasible consequence.
7.1. Existence of extensions
The former problem, that of the existence of extensions, has long been considered one
of the basic problems of default logic. This problem has been analyzed from the point of
view of computational complexity in [9,10,16,32]. In these works, broad classes of default
theories have been singled out, for which extensions (in Reiter’s sense) can be proved
to exist. One such class comprises the ordered default theories of [9,32]. An even more
general approach is advocated in [27], where it is shown that even default theories always
have extensions. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that, within the framework of Reiter’s
approach, the result of [27] is optimal and cannot be improved upon.
Several proposals have been put forward for somewhat different notions of extensions
for default theories to solve this problem. As mentioned extensions always exist
according to the notions of extensions proposed by Łukaszewicz [18,19], Brewka [6],
and Delgrande et al. [7]. However, these proposals are characterized by an essentially
different interpretation of rôle of the justification of a default. According to the original
intuition of Reiter [30] (which is adhered to in this paper) the justification of a default
is to be interpreted as a mere consistency condition on the “triggering” of the default.
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This allows, for instance, for the simultaneous triggering of defaults having mutually
inconsistent justifications (provided, of course, that the conclusions are not in turn also
inconsistent). This sometimes leads to counter-intuitive results as in the “broken-arms”
example of Poole [28] (discussed in Section 2).
There is a second interpretation, championed for instance by Delgrande et al. [7], that
rather views the justification of a default as a “working hypothesis”, whose truth (as
opposed to its mere consistency) is to be assumed until and unless there is information
to the contrary. This intuition quite naturally leads to the so called “commitment to the
justifications”, one of whose consequences, for instance, is that defaults with mutually
inconsistent justifications cannot be simultaneously fired, in spite of the fact that their
conclusions might be consistent. In other words, the intuition behind this interpretation
is that we cannot entertain inconsistent working hypotheses, and that therefore the truth of
these working hypotheses should be assumed not only in each individual firing of a default,
but also across firings of different defaults.
It is important to observe that extensions (in any of the senses available in the literature)
for default theories can rarely be constructed (when they exist) by means of a cumulative
process, of the sort in which defaults are successively assessed for some kind of property
that can guarantee their belonging to the extension being constructed. On the contrary, in
most cases, we first have to “guess” a set Θ of defaults and then check that it does indeed
satisfy the equation defining extensions.
This seems to be connected, at an intuitive level, with the fact that the notions of
extension employed by Reiter and many others are intrinsically “two-valued”, in the
sense that such extensions contain the consequences of a maximal set of defaults whose
justifications are consistent with the extension itself. This means, among other things, that
the triggering of a default can only be prevented if its justification or conclusion is explicitly
refuted. Let us informally refer to an approach to default logic as “bold” if it shares this
feature that any admissible default not explicitly pre-empted or conflicted is triggered. The
formal counterpart to this idea is that one set of defaults is used to accomplish a two-fold
task, namely the specification of which defaults are triggered and which defaults are pre-
empted.
On the other hand, the notion of extension employed in this paper is essentially “three-
valued”, similarly to the one put forward in [1] for defeasible inheritance networks, and
equally inspired by an analogy to Kripke’s [17] approach to the theory of truth. When using
general extensions, a default having a sentence ϕ as its justification (and whose conclusion
is otherwise consistent) is prevented from being triggered if and only if ¬ϕ is not explicitly
rejected. With Reiter’s notion of extension, a default having a sentence ϕ as its justification
can be prevented from being triggered if and only if ¬ϕ is explicitly asserted. As a further
difference, contrary to Reiter’s extensions, extensions of the sort proposed here can in
many cases be obtained as the limit of a genuine inductive construction. By this we mean
that general extensions can be constructed “from below” in stages. With the usual notion
of extension such a construction from below is possible only when the theory is semi-
monotonic, a desirable feature that is not always easy to enforce (see [7] for a discussion
of the desirability of semi-monotonicity and the ways it can be achieved).
The intuitions at the basis of the notion of general extension here proposed are quite
different also from those underlying the approach of Łukaszewicz, Brewka, or Delgrande
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et al., and this in spite of the superficial resemblances. If Reiter’s notion of extension is
to be generalized in such a way as to allow every default theory to have an extension, our
proposal generalizes in a different direction from the one of mentioned above, a direction
giving rise, as we have already seen, to quite different mathematical properties (some of
these properties are summarized in Fig. 2).
This is perhaps the right place to point out that an approach somewhat similar to ours
has been developed for logic programming. A “three-valued” or “well-founded” semantics
for logic programs has been developed by van Gelder et al. in [13], and has found what is
perhaps the most general formulation in the notion of “stable model” of Fitting [11]. And of
course, similarities between logic programs and default theories have long been known (see
Przymusin´ski [29], who applies such three-valued models to defeasible representational
formalisms, although not explicitly to default logic).
However, the approach of this paper differs from the above, first of all, in being “three
valued” only in inspiration. In particular, the underlying logic is thoroughly classical. The
“three valued” intuition is rather cashed out by identifying extensions for default logic
not with sets of sentences or defaults, but with pairs (or, later, triples) of such sets.
This allows for a more concrete representation of extensions, whose properties can then
be more easily investigated. Moreover, the present approach gives rise, when applied to
arbitrary default theories (as opposed to “categorical” or “prerequisite-free” ones), to both
monotonic and anti-monotonic processes that in general do not seem to arise in the well-
founded approaches to logic programming, except in the general approach of Fitting [11].
7.2. Defeasible consequence—again
We now come to the second technical fallout of the notion of general extension, namely
the definition of a well-behaved relation of defeasible consequence.
Using the notions of extension for Default Logic available in the literature, there are
several ways in which we can define, given a default theory having multiple incomparable
extensions, a relation |∼:
(1) We can decide to be credulous and say that (W,∆) |∼ϕ precisely when ϕ follows
from (the set of conclusions of defaults in) some extension of (W,∆).
(2) We can arbitrarily pick an extension Γ among the many possible, and decide that
(W,∆) |∼ϕ just in case ϕ follows from (conclusions of defaults in) Γ .
(3) We can be skeptical and say that (W,∆) |∼ϕ just in case ϕ follows from
(conclusions of defaults in) all extensions of (W,∆).
All three alternatives have drawbacks. Alternative (2) is not acceptable unless we have
a principled way to make such a choice of Γ . Alternative (1) can lead us sometimes
to endorse contradictory statements. Alternative (3) is the one that best resonates with
certain intuitions about defeasible reasoning, e.g., the fact that defeasible reasoners should
be cautious in drawing their inferences (see Horty et al. [15] for a general argument in
favor of skepticism in defeasible reasoning), but it seems to be going about it the wrong
way. It does not appear to be an appropriate “implementation” of skepticism to generate
all possible extensions of a theory and then take the intersection. The contrast here is
with a “directly skeptical” approach that would generate the set of conclusions that are
skeptically acceptable without going through the detour of first generating all credulous
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extensions. Moreover, if feasibility of computation is an issue at all, the “intersection-of-
extensions” approach is by far the least resource-oriented. To clinch matters, as shown by
Makinson [20], the intersection of extensions approach using Reiter’s notion, simply does
not give rise to a cautiously monotonic relation of defeasible consequence for default logic.
The cautiously three-valued character of general extensions is responsible for the fact
that at least in some important cases there is a natural definition of a notion of logical
consequence for default theories. In particular, as we have seen, in the case of semi-normal
default theories, there is a privileged (unique minimal) general extension which can be
used to define a notion of defeasible consequence. (It is also worth remarking that at
least in the case of semi-normal default theories the least extension can be obtained by
means of a genuine inductive construction—in this being similar to, e.g., “prerequisite-free
constrained default logic” (PfConDL) of [7], which also allows for a similar construction,
but using quite different underlying intuitions.)
In contrast, there is no privileged extension in any of the senses of Reiter [30],
Łukaszewicz [18,19], Brewka [6] or Delgrande et al. [7]. In fact, extensions are always
taken to be maximal, meaning that any two distinct extensions are ⊆-incomparable, if not
outright mutually inconsistent.
Acknowledgement
I thank Mel Fitting for illuminating conversations on the semantics of logic programs, as
well as Dagfinn Føllesdal and Horacio Arlo Costa for helpful comments. I am indebted to
two anonymous referees for the journal Artificial Intelligence for providing useful feedback
and criticisms, and especially for pointing out the crucial Example 4.2.
Appendix A. Proofs of selected theorems
Theorem 1.5. Let Γ + be a classical extension for a categorical default theory (W,∆),
and put
Γ − = {δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +},
then (Γ +,Γ −) is a general extension for (W,∆).
Proof. From the hypothesis that Γ + is a classical extension we know that it satisfies
Γ + = {δ ∈∆: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
First we note that Γ + and Γ − are disjoint: if δ belongs to both Γ + and Γ − then (from
the latter) we have that either δ is conflicted in Γ + or δ is pre-empted in Γ +. The second
alternative is impossible, since δ is in Γ + (and hence not pre-empted in Γ +); therefore it
can only be that δ is conflicted in Γ +, i.e., C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ). Since δ itself is in Γ +,
we have that C(Γ +) is W -inconsistent and any default is pre-empted in an inconsistent set
of sentences. It would follow that δ is pre-empted in Γ + after all, which we have already
ruled out. We conclude that there cannot be any such δ.
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So we need to show that the pair (Γ +,Γ −) satisfies the pair of fixpoint equations of
Definition 1.4. In turn, we observe that the second of such equations, namely
Γ − = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ)},
is satisfied by definition of Γ −. So we need to establish that
Γ + = {δ: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&C(∆− Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
So what we need to show is that δ is not pre-empted in Γ + if and only if it is neither
conflicted in Γ + nor pre-empted in ∆− Γ −:
C
(
Γ +
) 6|=W ¬J (δ) ⇐⇒ C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&C(∆− Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ).
In turn, this claim breaks down into the following, which need to be separately established:
(1) C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ) only if C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(∆− Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ);
(2) C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) only if C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ);
(3) C(∆− Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ) only if C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ).
Part (1) establishes the converse implication, while parts (2) and (3) together suffice for the
direct implication.
For part (1), assume C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ); then there are defaults δ1, . . . , δn ∈ Γ + such
that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δn) |=W ¬J (δ); since Γ + is a classical extension, δ1, . . . , δn are neither
conflicted nor pre-empted in Γ +, whence by definition of Γ − we have δ1, . . . , δn /∈ Γ −,
which is to say C(∆− Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ). Part (1) follows.
For part (2), suppose C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ). We can assume that C(Γ +) is consistent,
because otherwise the conclusion C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ) follows immediately. Then, if
C(Γ +) is consistent, we have δ /∈ Γ + (since C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ)), and since Γ + is a
classical extension, also C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ), which is the desired conclusion.
Finally, for part (3), suppose δ is pre-empted in C(∆ − Γ −), i.e., C(∆ − Γ −) |=W
¬J (δ). Then there are δ1, . . . , δn /∈ Γ − such that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δn) |=W ¬J (δ). By the
definition of Γ −, we know that δ1, . . . , δn are neither conflicted nor pre-empted in Γ +,
and since Γ + is a classical extension, we have δ1, . . . , δn ∈ Γ + by Theorem 1.3. The
desired conclusion C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ) follows. 2
Theorem 1.6. Every categorical default theory has a general extension.
Proof. Let (W,∆) be a categorical default theory; we can assume that W is consistent,
because otherwise (∅,∆) is an extension. We define a general extension (Γ +,Γ −),
where Γ + is the union of a sequence Γ +0 ,Γ
+
1 , . . . and Γ − is the union of the sequence
Γ −0 ,Γ
−
1 , . . . ; in turn, the sets Γ
+
n and Γ −n are inductively defined using an iterative process
similar to the one in [14] or [1].
For the base case put Γ +0 = Γ −0 = ∅, which are obviously disjoint. For the inductive
step, let Γ +n+1 be a maximal set of defaults such that:
(1) C(Γ +n ∪Γ +n+1) is consistent;
(2) no default δ ∈ Γ +n+1 is pre-empted in ∆− Γ −n .
(Observe that such a maximal set of defaults always exists, although it might not be
unique.) For Γ −n+1, put
Γ −n+1 =
{
δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +n+1
}
.
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As in the proof of Theorem 1.5, it follows that Γ +n+1 and Γ
−
n+1 are disjoint.
Next, we show that Γ +n ⊆ Γ +n+1 and Γ −n ⊆ Γ −n+1, by induction on n. The base case for
n = 0 is trivial. For the inductive step, assume Γ +n ⊆ Γ +n+1 and Γ −n ⊆ Γ −n+1, in order to
show Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +n+2 and Γ −n+1 ⊆ Γ −n+2.
Ad Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +n+2. Let δ ∈ Γ +n+1. First we show that δ is not pre-empted in∆−Γ −n+1: for
if δ were so pre-empted, then C(∆−Γ −n+1) |=W ¬J (δ), and since (∆−Γ −n+1)⊆ (∆−Γ −n )
by the inductive hypothesis, also C(∆−Γ −n ) |=W ¬J (δ), which is impossible if δ ∈ Γ +n+1.
Moreover, by the consistency of C(Γ +n+1 ∪ Γ +n+2), we have that δ cannot be inconsistent
with C(Γ +n+1 ∪ Γ +n+2). By the maximality of Γ +n+2, it follows δ ∈ Γ +n+2.
Ad Γ −n+1 ⊆ Γ −n+2. Suppose δ ∈ Γ −n+1. Then δ is either conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +n+1,
and since Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +n+2, we have that δ is also conflicted or, respectively, pre-empted in
Γ +n+2, so that δ ∈ Γ −n+2.
This shows that the sequences Γ +n and Γ −n (for n> 0) are increasing. Put:
Γ + =
⋃
n>0
Γ +n ;
Γ − =
⋃
n>0
Γ −n .
We verify that (Γ +,Γ −) is an extension for (W,∆). First we observe that Γ + and Γ − are
disjoint (any common member δ would have had to be put in at some stage n, but this is
impossible). Next, we check that the following equation is satisfied:
Γ + = {δ: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&C(∆− Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
In one direction, let δ ∈ Γ + and choose k such that δ ∈ Γ +k . First we show that δ cannot
be conflicted in Γ +, for otherwise it would have been conflicted in some Γ +n , and in
particular also in Γ +max(n,k) which would then have been inconsistent, against construction.
Moreover, δ cannot be pre-empted in ∆ − Γ −: if it were so pre-empted, then for some
δ1, . . . , δm /∈ Γ − we would have C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W ¬J (δ). Since the sequence Γ −n is
increasing, the sequence (∆− Γ −n ) is decreasing, so that δ would have been pre-empted
also in some (indeed: every) ∆− Γ −n .
For the other direction, we need to show that if δ is neither conflicted in Γ + nor
pre-empted in ∆ − Γ − then δ ∈ Γ +. First observe that if δ is not conflicted in Γ +,
then it cannot be conflicted in any Γ +n . So, if δ /∈ Γ + it must be because δ is pre-
empted in every ∆ − Γ −n . So for every n > 0, there are δ1, . . . , δm /∈ Γ −n such that
C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W ¬J (δ). Now for the first time we use the finiteness hypothesis for∆:
since ∆ is finite, there are finitely manym-tuple of defaults. Since the sequence (∆−Γ −n )
is decreasing, some m-tuple of defaults pre-empting δ must be in every (∆ − Γ −n ), and
hence also in (∆− Γ −), against hypothesis. So, there must be some k such that every m-
tuple δ1, . . . , δm of defaults pre-empting δ has a member in Γ −k . Then δ is not pre-empted
in (∆− Γ −k ), whence δ ∈ Γ +k+1 ⊆ Γ +, as required.
For the second equation, we need to verify
Γ − = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ)}.
G.A. Antonelli / Artificial Intelligence 109 (1999) 71–109 97
In one direction, suppose δ ∈ Γ −; then for some n, δ ∈ Γ −n+1, so that δ is pre-empted
or conflicted in Γ +n+1. This implies that δ is also pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +. For the
other direction, suppose δ is pre-empted in Γ +. So there are defaults δ1, . . . , δm ∈ Γ + such
that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W ¬J (δ). Find n large enough such that δ1, . . . , δm ∈ Γ +n . Then
δ ∈ Γ −n ⊆ Γ −. The case for δ conflicted is similar. 2
Theorem 3.3. Let Γ be a classical extension for a default theory (W,∆); then Γ is
grounded.
Proof. Since Γ is classical, Γ =⋃n>0 Γn, where Γ0 = ∅ and
Γn+1 = {δ: δ admissible in Γn and not pre-empted in Γ }.
In order to show that Γ is grounded, putΘ0 = ∅ andΘn+1 = {δ ∈ Γ : δ admissible in Θn}.
We need to show Γ =⋃n>0Θn, i.e.,⋃
n>0
Γn =
⋃
n>0
Θn.
First we observe that the inclusionΘn ⊆ Γ holds for every n, by definition ofΘn. It follows
that
⋃
n>0Θn ⊆ Γ .
Second, we show that Γ ⊆⋃n>0Θn. In turn, it suffices to show that Γp ⊆⋃n>0Θn
for every p. We proceed by induction on p. For the base case, Γ0 = ∅ ⊆⋃n>0Θn. For
the inductive step assume Γp ⊆⋃n>0Θn. Suppose δ ∈ Γp+1: in particular, δ is admissible
in Γp. So there are defaults δ1, . . . , δm ∈ Γp such that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W P(δ). By the
inductive hypothesis Γp ⊆⋃n>0Θn, so there must be q > 0 such that δ1, . . . , δm ∈ Θq .
Then δ ∈Θq+1 ⊆⋃n>0Θn, as required.
If we now put Θ =⋃n>0Θn, we have Γ =Θ . Then we have Θ0 = ∅ and Θn+1 = {δ ∈
Θ: δ admissible in Θn}. So Θ is grounded and hence so is Γ . 2
Theorem 3.7. Let Γ + =⋃n>0 Γ +n be a classical extension for a default theory (W,∆).
Put:
Γ − = {δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +};
Γ ∗ = {δ: δ admissible in Γ +}= Ad(Γ +).
Then (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is a general extension for (W,∆).
Proof. We modify the proof of Theorem 1.5 as needed. From the hypothesis that Γ + is
a classical extension it follows that if δ ∈ Γ − then δ /∈ Γ +, i.e., Γ + and Γ − are disjoint.
Moreover, we know that Γ + =⋃n>0 Γ +n , where Γ +0 = ∅, and
Γ +n+1 =
{
δ ∈∆: C(Γ +n ) |=W P(δ)&C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
So we need to show that the triple (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) satisfies the conditions of Defini-
tion 3.4. In turn, we observe that the condition
Γ − = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ)},
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is satisfied by definition of Γ −, whereas the condition
Ad
(
Γ +
)⊆ Γ ∗ ⊆ {δ: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬P(δ)},
derives from the hypothesis thatW is consistent and hence C(Γ +) is W -consistent. So we
need to establish that
Γ + = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W P(δ)&C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&C(Γ ∗ − Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
In other words, what we need to show is that δ ∈ Γ + if and only if it is admissible in Γ +,
but neither conflicted in Γ + nor pre-empted in Γ ∗ − Γ −. In turn, this claim breaks down
into the following four parts:
(1) δ /∈ Γ + only if C(Γ +) 6|=W P(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W
¬J (δ);
(2) C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) only if δ /∈ Γ +;
(3) C(Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ) only if δ /∈ Γ +;
(4) C(Γ +) 6|=W P(δ) only if δ /∈ Γ +.
For part (1), assume δ /∈ Γ +. Since Γ + is classical, by Theorem 1.3, either (i) δ is
not admissible in Γ +, or (ii) it is conflicted in Γ +, or (iii) it is pre-empted in Γ +. The
conclusion follows immediately in cases (i) and (ii). For case (iii) we need to show that if δ
is pre-empted in Γ +, then it is pre-empted in C(Γ ∗ −Γ −). So suppose δ is pre-empted in
Γ +: then there are defaults δ1, . . . , δn ∈ Γ + such that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δn) |=W ¬J (δ). Since
Γ + is a classical extension, δ1, . . . , δn are neither conflicted nor pre-empted in Γ +, whence
by definition of Γ − we have δ1, . . . , δn /∈ Γ −. Moreover, again because Γ + is classical,
we have that δ1, . . . , δn are all admissible in Γ +, and hence δ1, . . . , δn ∈ Γ ∗. It follows that
C(Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ), whence part (1) follows.
For part (2), we have immediately that since Γ + is classical, the hypothesis that δ ∈ Γ +
implies that δ is not conflicted in Γ +.
For part (3), suppose δ is pre-empted in C(Γ ∗ − Γ −), i.e.,
C
(
Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ).
Then there are δ1, . . . , δn /∈ Γ − such that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δn) |=W ¬J (δ). In particular,
δ1, . . . , δn belong to Γ ∗ and hence are admissible in Γ +; moreover by the definition of
Γ −, we know that δ1, . . . , δn are neither conflicted nor pre-empted in Γ +. So, since Γ +
is a classical extension, we have δ1, . . . , δn ∈ Γ + by Theorem 1.3. The desired conclusion
C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ) follows.
Finally, for part (4), if δ ∈ Γ + then δ is admissible in Γ +, since Γ + is a classical
extension. 2
Theorem 3.8. Let (W,∆) be a default theory. Then:
(i) every default theory has an iteratively definable general extension;
(ii) such an extension is 6-minimal; and
(iii) any minimal extension for (W,∆) is grounded.
Proof. Part (i) is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.6. Let (W,∆) be a default theory. We
define a general extension (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗), where Γ + =⋃n>0 Γ +n and Γ − =⋃n>0 Γ −n ,
whereas Γ ∗ =⋂n>0 Γ ∗n .
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For the base case put Γ +0 = ∅, Γ −0 = {δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +0 }, and Γ ∗0 =
{δ: Γ +0 6|=W ¬P(δ)}.
For the inductive step, let Γ +n+1 be a maximal set of defaults such that:
(1) C(Γ +n ∪Γ +n+1) is consistent;
(2) every δ ∈ Γ +n+1 is admissible in Γ +n ;
(3) no default δ ∈ Γ +n+1 is pre-empted in Γ ∗n − Γ −n .
(Observe again that such a maximal set of defaults need not be unique.) Moreover, put:
Γ −n+1 =
{
δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +n+1
};
Γ ∗n+1 =
{
δ: C
(
Γ +n+1
) 6|=W ¬P(δ)}.
Next, we show that the sequences Γ +n and Γ −n are increasing, whereas the sequence Γ ∗n
is decreasing. We proceed by induction on n and show that:
(1) Γ +n ⊆ Γ +n+1;
(2) Γ −n ⊆ Γ −n+1;
(3) Γ ∗n+1 ⊆ Γ ∗n .
Base case for n = 0: trivially we have Γ +0 ⊆ Γ +1 . Moreover, if δ ∈ Γ −0 , then δ is
conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +0 : then it is also conflicted or pre-empted in Γ
+
1 , so that δ ∈
Γ −1 . This shows Γ
−
0 ⊆ Γ −1 . Finally, if C(Γ +0 ) |=W ¬P(δ), then also C(Γ +1 ) |=W ¬P(δ),
so that Γ ∗1 ⊆ Γ ∗0 .
For the inductive step, assume Γ +n ⊆ Γ +n+1 and Γ −n ⊆ Γ −n+1, as well as Γ ∗n+1 ⊆ Γ ∗n , in
order to show the analogue properties for n+ 1 and n+ 2.
Ad Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +n+2. Let δ ∈ Γ +n+1. First we show that δ is not pre-empted in Γ ∗n+1−Γ −n+1:
for if δ were so pre-empted, then C(Γ ∗n+1 − Γ −n+1) |=W ¬J (δ), and since by the inductive
hypothesis (∆−Γ −n+1)⊆ (∆−Γ −n ), as well as Γ ∗n+1 ⊆ Γ ∗n also C(Γ ∗n −Γ −n ) |=W ¬J (δ),
which is impossible if δ ∈ Γ +n+1. Moreover, by the W -consistency of C(Γ +n+1 ∪ Γ +n+2), we
have that δ cannot beW -inconsistent with C(Γ +n+1 ∪Γ +n+2). By the maximality of Γ +n+2, it
follows δ ∈ Γ +n+2.
Ad Γ −n+1 ⊆ Γ −n+2. Suppose δ ∈ Γ −n+1. Then δ is either conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +n+1,
and since Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +n+2, we have that δ is also conflicted or, respectively, pre-empted in
Γ +n+2, so that δ ∈ Γ −n+2.
Finally, ad Γ ∗n+2 ⊆ Γ ∗n+1. This follows from the fact that Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +n+2, so that if
C(Γ +n+1) |=W ¬P(δ) then also C(Γ +n+2) |=W ¬P(δ).
This shows that the sequences Γ +n and Γ −n are increasing whereas Γ ∗n is decreasing (for
n> 0). It is not hard to see that the sequences Γ +n and Γ −n are disjoint. Now put:
Γ + =
⋃
n>0
Γ +n ;
Γ − =
⋃
n>0
Γ −n ;
Γ ∗ =
⋂
n>0
Γ ∗n .
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Observe that C(Γ +) must be consistent, given the assumption that W is consistent. We
verify that (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is an extension for (W,∆). First we remark that the sets Γ + and
Γ − are disjoint, since they are the limits of disjoint sequences. Then we check that the
following equation is satisfied:
Γ + = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W P(δ)&C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬C(δ)&C(Γ ∗ − Γ −) 6|=W ¬J (δ)}.
In one direction, let δ ∈ Γ + and choose k such that δ ∈ Γ +k . First we observe that δ cannot
be conflicted in Γ +, for otherwise it would have been conflicted in some Γ +n , and in
particular also in Γ +max(n,k) which would then have been inconsistent, against construction.
Moreover, δ must be admissible in Γ +k and hence in Γ +. Finally, δ cannot be pre-empted
in Γ ∗ − Γ −: if it were so pre-empted, then for some δ1, . . . , δm ∈ (Γ ∗ − Γ −) we would
have C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W ¬J (δ). Since the sequence Γ −n is increasing, the sequence
(∆− Γ −n ) is decreasing, so that δ would have been pre-empted also in every (Γ ∗n − Γ −n ),
including (Γ ∗k − Γ −k ).
For the other direction, we need to show that if δ is admissible in Γ + but neither
conflicted in Γ + nor pre-empted in Γ ∗ − Γ − then δ ∈ Γ +. First observe that if δ is not
conflicted in Γ +, then it cannot be conflicted in any Γ +n . Moreover, if δ is admissible
in Γ + it must be admissible in Γ +k for every k greater than or equal to some p. So, if
δ /∈ Γ + it must be because δ is pre-empted in every Γ ∗n+p − Γ −n+p . So for every n > 0,
there are δ1, . . . , δm ∈ (Γ ∗n+p − Γ −n+p) such that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W ¬J (δ). Now we
use the finiteness hypothesis for ∆: since ∆ is finite, and the sequence (Γ ∗n − Γ −n ) is
decreasing, there is some m-tuple δ1, . . . , δm pre-empting δ and some q > 0 such that
δ1, . . . , δm ∈ (Γ ∗p − Γ −p ) for all p > q . Then δ is pre-empted in Γ ∗ − Γ −, against
assumption. So δ ∈ Γ +k+1 ⊆ Γ +, as required.
For the second equation, we need to verify
Γ − = {δ: C(Γ +) |=W ¬C(δ) or C(Γ +) |=W ¬J (δ)}.
In one direction, suppose δ ∈ Γ −; then for some n, δ ∈ Γ −n+1, so that δ is pre-empted
or conflicted in Γ +n+1. This implies that δ is also pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +. For the
other direction, suppose δ is pre-empted in Γ +. So there are defaults δ1, . . . , δm ∈ Γ + such
that C(δ1), . . . ,C(δm) |=W ¬J (δ). Find n large enough such that δ1, . . . , δm ∈ Γ +n . Then
δ ∈ Γ −n ⊆ Γ −. The case for δ conflicted is similar.
Finally, the condition
Ad
(
Γ +
)⊆ Γ ∗ ⊆ {δ: C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬P(δ)},
is satisfied by construction. For the first inclusion we observe that if δ is admissible in
Γ + then C(Γ +) 6|=W ¬P(δ) given that C(Γ +) is consistent. For the second inclusion,
if C(Γ +) |=W ¬P(δ), then for some n C(Γ +n ) 6|=W ¬P(δ), whence δ /∈ Γ ∗n ; this implies
δ /∈⋂n>0 Γ ∗n = Γ ∗.
We now take up part (ii): we need to show that the extension obtained in the construction
given above is6-minimal. We do this by assuming that for some extension (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗),
we have(
Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗
)
6
(
Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗
)
,
G.A. Antonelli / Artificial Intelligence 109 (1999) 71–109 101
and showing that (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗) = (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗). In turn, by induction on n, it suffices
to show:
(1) Γ +n ⊆Θ+;
(2) Γ −n ⊆Θ−;
(3) Θ∗ ⊆ Γ ∗n .
In the case for n = 0, parts (1) and (2) are immediate. To show Θ∗ ⊆ Γ ∗0 suppose that
δ ∈Θ∗. Now, Γ ∗0 is the set of defaults whose pre-requisite is W -consistent (with Γ +0 ). If
P(δ) were W -inconsistent, then C(Θ+) |=W ¬P(δ), which implies δ /∈Θ∗.
For the inductive step, assume parts (1)–(3) for n, in order to establish them for n+ 1.
From (2) and (3) for n we have (Θ∗ −Θ−)⊆ (Γ ∗n − Γ −n ). Now suppose δ ∈ Γ +n+1; then:(i) δ is admissible in Γ +n and hence also in Θ+. (ii) δ is not pre-empted in (Γ ∗n −Γ −n ) and
hence not pre-empted in (Θ∗n −Θ−n ), either. It remains to show that δ is not conflicted in
Θ+; if it were so conflicted, since by hypothesis Θ+ ⊆ Γ +, δ would also be conflicted in
Γ +m , for some m> n+ 1. Since δ ∈ Γ +n+1 ⊆ Γ +m , we would have C(Γ +m ) W -inconsistent,
which is impossible in our construction. This concludes the inductive step for (1).
The inductive step for (2) follows immediately from the inductive hypothesis. For (3), we
need to show Θ∗ ⊆ Γ ∗n+1. If δ /∈ Γ ∗n+1, then C(Γ +n+1) |=W ¬P(δ), and since Γ +n+1 ⊆Θ+,
also C(Θ+) |=W ¬P(δ), so that δ /∈Θ∗.
Finally, for part (iii) of the theorem, we show that Γ + is grounded. Put Θ0 = ∅, and
Θn+1 = {δ ∈ Γ +: δ admissible in Θn}. If we let Θ =⋃n>0Θn, then as before it suffice to
show Θ = Γ +. As in Theorem 3.3, Θ ⊆ Γ + is immediate. For the converse inclusion, we
can show by induction on n that Γ +n ⊆Θ , whence
⋃
n>0 Γ
+
n ⊆Θ . 2
Theorem 3.9. Let (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) be a 6-minimal extension for a default theory (W,∆).
Then (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) can be obtained as the limit of an inductive construction of the kind
given in the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Proof. Suppose we have defined sets of defaults Θ+n , Θ−n , and Θ∗n (the first two subsets
of Γ +, Γ −, respectively, and the third a superset of Γ ∗), in such a way as to conform to
the construction of Theorem 3.8. Then, if we put:
Θ+ =
⋃
n>0
Θ+n , Θ− =
⋃
n>0
Θ∗n , Θ∗ =
⋂
n>0
Θ∗n ,
we have that (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗) 6 (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗), and moreover (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗) is an
extension. By minimality of (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗), we have(
Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗
)= (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗),
and the conclusion follows.
So we need to show how to define Θ+n , Θ−n , and Θ∗n . We define Θ+0 = Θ−0 = ∅, and
Θ∗0 = the set of defaults whose prerequisite is consistent. For the inductive step, we pick
as Θ+n+1 the set of defaults, all drawn from Γ +, that are admissible at the previous stage:
Θ+n+1 =
{
δ ∈ Γ +: C(Θ+n ) |=W P(δ)}.
In order to show that this conforms to the construction, we need to establish that Θ+n+1
is a maximal set of defaults having the following properties: (i) C(Θ+n ∪ Θ+n+1) is
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W -consistent; (ii) every δ ∈ Θ+n+1 is admissible in Θ+n ; and (iii) no default in Θ+n+1 is
pre-empted in (Θ∗n −Θ−n ).
Clearly Θ+n+1 has properties (i)–(iii); we need to show that it is maximal with those
properties. Suppose for contradiction that some δ /∈ Θ+n+1 could be adjoined to Θ+n+1
preserving (i)–(iii). Then, in particular, δ would be admissible in Θ+n , and since δ /∈Θ+n+1,
it must be that δ /∈ Γ +.
On the other hand, since Θ+n ⊆ Γ +, we have that δ is admissible in Γ +; and since
(Γ ∗ −Γ −)⊆ (Θ∗n −Θ−n ), we have that δ cannot be pre-empted in (Γ ∗ − Γ −) (not being
pre-empted in the larger set). But since we assumed (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) to be an extension,
we would have δ ∈ Γ +, contradicting the conclusion reached at the end of the previous
paragraph.
We conclude that Θ+n+1 is a maximal subset of ∆ satisfying (i)–(iii). Now, by defining
Θ−n+1 and Θ∗n+1 in the obvious way, we obtain that the sequence thus obtained conforms
to the construction of Theorem 3.8. The limit (Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗) is therefore an extension and
by construction,(
Θ+,Θ−,Θ∗
)
6
(
Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗
)
.
Minimality of (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) gives the desired conclusion. 2
Theorem 5.1. Let (W,∆) be a default theory, and suppose (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is a 3-tuple
of subsets of ∆ such that C(Γ +) |=W ϕ. Then (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is a general extension for
(W,∆), if and only if it is a general extension for (W ∪ {ϕ},∆).
Proof. We do the case for a categorical default theory, the general case being similar. Since
C(Γ +) |=W ϕ, any default δ is conflicted in Γ + relative to W if and only if it is conflicted
in Γ + relative to W ∪ {ϕ}. Thus, in order to establish the theorem it suffices to establish
that δ is pre-empted in ∆− Γ − relative to W if and only if δ is so pre-empted relative to
W ∪ {ϕ}.
One direction is immediate: if δ is pre-empted in ∆−Γ − relative to W then it is still so
pre-empted relative to W ∪ {ϕ}, by monotonicity of classical logic.
For the converse, assume δ is pre-empted in ∆− Γ − relative to W ∪ {ϕ}. Then:
C
(
∆− Γ −) |=W∪{ϕ} ¬J (δ); (A.1)
But by hypothesis, C(Γ +) |=W ϕ, and by disjointness of Γ + and Γ −, also Γ + ⊆
(∆− Γ −). By monotonicity of classical logic, C(∆− Γ −) |=W ϕ, whence by (A.1) and
Cut (for classical logic), also C(∆− Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ), as desired. 2
Theorem 5.4. Suppose (W,∆) |∼ϕ and let Γ = limΓ n be a minimal extension for
(W + ϕ,∆). Then there is a minimal extension Θ = limΘn for (W,∆) such that Θ 6 Γ .
Proof. Since (W,∆) |∼ϕ and every default theory has a minimal extension, let Π =
limΠn be a minimal extension for (W,∆) such that C(Γ +) |=W ϕ. Let k > 0 be an integer
such that already C(Γ +k ) |=W ϕ.
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We are going to define a construction sequence Θn. For m6 k we put Θm =Πm. For
k+ n (where n > 0) we put:
Θ+k+n = a maximal subset of ∆ extending Γ +n , such that:
(A) C(Θ+k+n−1 ∪Θ+k+n) is W -consistent;
(B) every δ ∈Θ+k+n is admissible in Θ+k+n−1;
(C) no δ ∈Θ+k+n is pre-empted in Θ∗k+n−1 −Θ−k+n−1;
Θ−k+n =
{
δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Θ+k+n relative to W
};
Θ∗k+n =
{
δ: P(δ) is consistent with C(Θ+k+n) relative to W
}
.
Since any maximal subset of ∆ extending Γ +n and having properties (A), (B), and (C) is
also a maximal subset of∆ having properties (A), (B), and (C), we obtain immediately that
Θn is a construction sequence and that Θ = limΘn is a minimal extension for (W,∆).
So we need to show Γ 6Θ ; in turn, it suffices to show that Γ n 6Θk+n. This we do by
induction on n.
Case n = 0. Since we have Γ +0 = Γ −0 = ∅, all we need to show is that Θ∗k+0 ⊆ Γ ∗0 ={δ: P(δ) is W + ϕ-consistent}. Now,
Θ∗k+0 = {δ: P(δ) is W + ϕ-consistent}.
Since by construction C(Θ+k+0) |=W ϕ, we have that if P(δ) is W + ϕ-inconsistent then it
is also W -inconsistent with C(Θ+k+0). So if δ /∈ Γ ∗0 then also δ /∈Θ∗k+0, as desired. This
shows Γ 0 6Θk+0.
Case n+ 1. Assume Γ n 6Θk+n, in order to show Γ n+1 6Θk+n+1. By construction,
Θ+k+n+1 extends Γ
+
n+1. In order to prove Γ
−
n+1 ⊆Θ−n+1, recall that by definition:
Θ−k+n+1 =
{
δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Θ+k+n+1 relative to W
};
Γ −n+1 =
{
δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +n+1 relative to W + ϕ
}
.
Now, if δ is pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +n+1 relative to W + ϕ, since C(Θ+k+n+1) |=W ϕ
and Γ +n+1 ⊆ Θ+k+n+1, δ is also pre-empted or (respectively) conflicted in Θ+k+n+1 relative
to W . So Γ −n+1 ⊆Θ−n+1.
Finally, ad Θ∗k+n+1 ⊆ Γ ∗n+1. We have:
Θ∗k+n+1 =
{
δ: P(δ) is W -consistent with Θ+k+n+1
};
Γ ∗n+1 =
{
δ: P(δ) is W + ϕ-consistent with Γ +n+1
}
.
Suppose δ /∈ Γ ∗n+1; then C(Γ +n+1) |=W+ϕ ¬P(δ). Since Γ +n+1 ⊆ Θ+k+n+1 and C(Θ+k+n+1)
|=W ϕ, also C(Θ+k+n+1) |=W ¬P(δ), whence δ /∈Θ∗k+n+1 as desired.
This concludes the induction, showing Γ 6Θ . 2
Theorem 5.5. Suppose (W,∆) |∼ϕ and let Γ = limΓ n be a minimal extension for
(W + ϕ,∆). Then there is a minimal extension Θ = limΘn for (W,∆) such that Θ 6 Γ .
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Proof. Since Γ is a minimal extension for (W + ϕ,∆) and (W,∆) |∼ϕ, we know from
the previous Theorem 5.4, that there is a minimal extensionΠ for (W,∆) above Γ (in the
6 ordering). Pick such an extension, which will remain fixed for the rest of the proof. We
will show that there is an extension for (W,∆) below Γ : of course it will follow that there
is a minimal extension for (W,∆) below Γ .
Such an extension Θ that is below Γ (in the ordering 6) will be defined as the limit
of an increasing sequence, i.e., Θ = limΘn. For n = 0 we put Θ+0 = Θ−0 = ∅, and
Θ∗0 = {δ: P(δ) is W -consistent}.
For the inductive step:
Θ+n+1 = a maximal subset of Π+ such that:
(A) C(Θ+n ∪Θ+n ) is W -consistent;
(B) every δ in Θ+n+1 is admissible in Θ+n relative to W ;
(C) no δ ∈Θ+n+1 is pre-empted in Θ∗n −Θ−n , relative to W .
Having done this, we define Θ−n+1 and Θ∗n+1 as usual as the set of defaults pre-empted
or conflicted in Θ+n+1 relative to W , and (respectively) as the set of defaults whose pre-
requisite is consistent with Θ+n+1 relative to W .
So we can put Θ = limΘn. We need to establish the following:
(1) the sequence Θn is increasing in the ordering6; and
(2) Θ is an extension for (W,∆);
(3) Θ 6 Γ .
The proof for the first two items is precisely similar to the corresponding items in the proof
of Theorem 3.8, and we skip it. We concentrate on the last, crucial, item.
To showΘ 6 Γ suffices to showΘn 6 Γ by induction on n. The case for n= 0 is easy.
We have Θ+0 = ∅ ⊆ Γ +, and similarly for Θ−0 . Now {δ: P(δ) is W -consistent} =Θ∗0 : if
P(δ) is W -inconsistent then it is also W + ϕ inconsistent with C(Γ +), so if δ /∈Θ∗0 then
δ /∈ Γ ∗, i.e., Γ ∗ ⊆Θ∗0 .
Now the inductive step for n+1. We assume that δ ∈Θ+n+1 in order to show that δ ∈ Γ +;
in turn, this is established by proving that δ is admissible in Γ + relative to W + ϕ, not
conflicted in Γ + relative to W + ϕ and not pre-empted in Γ ∗ − Γ − relative to W + ϕ.
(1) δ is admissible in Θ+n relative to W and hence (since Θ+n ⊆ Γ +) also admissible in
Γ + relative to W + ϕ.
(2) By inductive hypothesis, we have (Γ ∗ − Γ −) ⊆ (Θ∗n − Θ−n ). Suppose for
contradiction that δ is pre-empted in (Γ ∗ − Γ −) relative to W + ϕ. Then(
Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W+ϕ ¬J (δ).
We show (Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W ϕ, whence(
Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W ¬J (δ),
which in turn gives (by monotonicity of |=W ) (Θ∗n − Θ−n ) |=W ¬J (δ), which is
impossible.
To prove (Γ ∗ − Γ −) |=W ϕ: we have that Π is a minimal extension for (W,∆):
since (W,∆) |∼ϕ, we have C(Π+) |=W ϕ. Since Π is an extension, all defaults in
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Π+ are admissible in Π+ and hence they belong to Π∗; since Π+ and Π− are
disjoint, we have Π+ ⊆ (Π∗ −Π−). It follows that (Π∗ −Π−) |=W ϕ, and since
Γ 6Π also (Γ ∗ −Γ −) |=W ϕ, as desired.
(3) Finally, we show that δ is not conflicted in Γ + relative to W + ϕ. If δ were so
conflicted, then C(Γ +) |=W+ϕ ¬C(δ), and since Γ + ⊆ Π+, also C(Π+) |=W+ϕ
¬C(δ).
But now, as before, C(Π+) |=W ϕ, so C(Π+) |=W ¬C(δ). In other words, δ is
conflicted in Π+ relative to W , which is impossible given that δ ∈Θ+n+1 ⊆Π+ and
Π is an extension for (W,∆).
As mentioned, this gives Θ+n+1 ⊆ Γ +. From this, we can obtain (using the fact that
S |=W ψ implies S |=W+ϕ ψ) that Θ−n+1 ⊆ Γ − and Γ ∗ ⊆ Θ∗n+1. In turn, this gives
Θ 6 Γ . 2
Theorem 5.7. The relation |∼ satisfies the properties of Cut, Reflexivity, and Stability.
Proof. We take up the different properties in turn. As we will see, Theorem 5.6 will play
a crucial rôle.
(1) Reflexivity: we need to show that if ϕ ∈ W then (W,∆) |∼ϕ. This follows
immediately: if (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) is any extension (minimal or otherwise) of the theory,
and ϕ ∈W , then in particular C(Γ +) |=W ϕ, so that (W,∆) |∼ϕ.
(2) Stability or Cautious Monotonicity: we need to show
(W,∆) |∼ϕ, (W,∆) |∼ψ
(W + ϕ,∆) |∼ψ .
Since (W,∆) |∼ϕ and (W,∆) |∼ψ , then for every 6-minimal extension Γ =
(Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) of (W,∆) we have C(Γ +) |=W ϕ ∧ ψ . By Theorem 5.6 each
such extension is also a 6-minimal extension of (W + ϕ,∆), and conversely. By
monotonicity of classical logic, C(Γ +) |=W+ϕ ψ , whence (W + ϕ,∆) |∼ψ , as
desired.
(3) Cut: we need to show
(W,∆) |∼ϕ, (W + ϕ,∆) |∼ψ
(W,∆) |∼ψ .
Let Γ = (Γ +,Γ −,Γ ∗) be 6-minimal extension of (W,∆): we need to show
C(Γ +) |=W ψ . By Theorem 5.1 and the first premise of Cut Γ is also a 6-minimal
extension of (W +ϕ,∆). By the second premise of Cut, C(Γ +) |=W+ϕ ψ . But also
C(Γ +) |=W ϕ: using Cut for classical logic, we haveC(Γ +) |=W ψ , as desired. 2
Theorem 6.1. Every semi-normal default theory has a unique minimal extension.
Proof. We do the case for (W,∆) categorical, the general case being similar. We define,
as in the proof of Theorem 1.6 a sequence of pairs of sets (Γ +n ,Γ −n ) of defaults, and we
begin by putting Γ +0 = Γ −0 = ∅. For the inductive step we put:
Γ +n+1 =
{
δ: δ not pre-empted in ∆− Γ −n
};
Γ −n+1 =
{
δ: δ pre-empted or conflicted in Γ +n+1
}
.
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We assume that the sequence (Γ +n ,Γ −n ) coincides with the one in the proof of Theorem 1.6
up to stage n, and show that this must be the case also at stage n + 1. Observe that the
inductive hypothesis yields, in particular, that C(Γ +n ) is W -consistent.
Now,Γ +n+1 has the property of being a maximal set of defaults not pre-empted in∆−Γ −n(being the set of all such defaults). So if we can show that it also has the further property
that C(Γ +n ∪ Γ +n+1) is W -consistent, it will follow that Γ +n+1 is a maximal set of defaults
having the two mentioned properties, and we will have recovered the construction given in
the proof of Theorem 1.6.
So we show thatC(Γ +n ∪Γ +n+1) isW -consistent. Suppose for contradiction that this fails.
We know that C(Γ +n ) isW -consistent by itself, so that if C(Γ +n ∪Γ +n+1) isW -inconsistent,
it must be that Γ +n+1 6= ∅. We will contradict this last fact, showing that Γ +n+1 = ∅.
From the hypothesis that C(Γ +n ∪ Γ +n+1) is W -inconsistent, it follows that there are
defaults δ1, . . . , δk ∈ Γ +n+1 such that
C
(
Γ +n
) |=W ¬(C(δ1)∧ · · · ∧C(δk)). (2)
Now we show that for each default δi among δ1, . . . , δk , we have δi ∈ (∆−Γ −n ). Reasoning
by reductio, suppose δi ∈ Γ −n . Then δi is either conflicted or pre-empted in Γ +n . But δi is
semi-normal, so that it cannot be conflicted without being already pre-empted. So this
implies that δi is pre-empted in Γ +n , and since Γ +n ⊆ (∆− Γ −n ), it follows that δi is pre-
empted in (∆−Γ −n ). But by definition, this is equivalent to δi /∈ Γ +n+1, against assumption.
We conclude that δ1, . . . , δk ∈ (∆− Γ −n ).
From (2) we have that
C(δ1), . . . ,C(δn) |=W ¬C
(
Γ +n
)
,
where ¬C(Γ +n ) is to be construed as the negation of the conjunction of conclusions of
defaults in Γ +n . Since δ1, . . . , δk ∈ (∆− Γ −n ), also
C
(
∆− Γ −n
) |=W ¬C(Γ +n ).
But Γ +n and Γ −n are disjoint, so that Γ +n ⊆ (∆−Γ −n ). We conclude that C(∆−Γ −n ) must
beW -inconsistent, so that any default is pre-empted in (∆−Γ −n ), whence Γ +n+1 = ∅. This
is the contradiction we sought.
We conclude that the construction given here coincides with the one given in the proof
of Theorem 1.6 in the case of semi-normal theories (or Theorem 3.8 in the noncategorical
case), and therefore the limit of the sequence of pairs of sets of defaults yields a general
extension. The process is now deterministic, so this extension is unique. We already know
from Theorem 3.8 that any extension obtained in this way is minimal. Theorem 3.9 gives
uniqueness. 2
Theorem 6.5. Let (W,∆) be a semi-normal theory, and suppose Γ is a potential extension
that is also a fixed point of τ . Then Γ is a general extension for (W,∆).
Proof. Let Θ be a fixed point of τ . First we observe that since W is consistent, Θ+ must
also beW -consistent: if not, then any δ is pre-empted inΘ+ relative toW , soΘ− =∆, and
by disjointness Θ+ = ∅. Therefore, if Θ+ is W -inconsistent it must be that W is already
inconsistent.
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Given that Θ is a fixed point, one easily verifies the equations defining extensions.
Similarly, it’s immediate to see that if P(δ) is W -inconsistent then δ /∈Θ∗. So all is left
to verify is that Θ∗ contains all δ admissible in Θ+: but if C(Θ+) |=W P(δ) then by W -
consistency of Θ+ also C(Θ+) 6|=W ¬P(δ), i.e., P(δ) is W -consistent with Θ+, whence
δ ∈Θ∗ as desired. 2
Theorem 6.7. Let (W,∆) be a default theory. Then there is an iteratively definable NT-
extension Θ for (W,∆).
Proof. We construct an NT-extension for (W,∆) iteratively by putting: Θ+0 = Θ−0 = ∅,
and Θ∗0 = {δ: P(δ) is W -consistent}.
For the inductive step, as in the proof of Theorem 3.8, we put:
Θ+n+1 = a maximal set of defaults such that:
(A) C(Θ+n ∪Θ+n ) is W -consistent;
(B) every δ in Θ+n+1 is admissible in Θ+n relative to W ;
(C) no δ ∈Θ+n+1 is pre-empted in Θ∗n −Θ−n , relative to W .
Now for the new twist: we put
Θ−n+1 =
{
δ: δ conflicted or pre-empted in Θ+n+1
}∪ {δ: C(Θ∗ −Θ−) 6|=W P(δ)}.
On the other hand, the definition of Θ∗ is the usual one: Θ∗ is the set of defaults δ whose
pre-requisite P(δ) is W -consistent with Θ+.
The first thing to prove is that the sequence we obtain is increasing, i.e., thatΘn 6Θn+1
for each n. This can be shown by induction on n, just like in the proof of Theorem 3.8,
except at the inductive step, where one shows Θ−n+1 ⊆ Θ−n+2. This we do in some detail.
So suppose δ ∈Θ−n+1; to show δ ∈Θ−n+2, we distinguish two cases.
(a) Suppose δ is pre-empted or conflicted in Θ+n ; then using the inductive hypothesis
we obtain that δ is pre-empted or conflicted in Θ+n+1 and hence δ ∈Θ−n+2.
(b) The other case is C(Θ∗n −Θ−n ) 6|=W P(δ). By the inductive hypothesis,Θ∗n+1 ⊆Θ∗n
and Θ−n ⊆Θ−n+1. It follows that (Θ∗n+1 −Θ−n+1) is a subset of (Θ∗n −Θ−n ), so that
C(Θ∗n+1 −Θ−n+1) 6|=W P(δ). So again we have δ ∈Θ−n+2.
Finally, we need to show that Θ = limΘn is an NT-extension. The only added
complication over the proof of Theorem 3.8 is when we check that
if C(Θ∗ −Θ−) 6|=W P(δ) then δ ∈Θ−.
We can assume that δ is not conflicted or pre-empted in Θ+ and hence not in any Θ+n , for
if it is then we immediately get δ ∈Θ−. So suppose that δ /∈Θ−. Then for each n we have
C(Θ∗n −Θ−n ) |=W P(δ). But the sequence C(Θ∗n −Θ−n ) is decreasing in n, so eventually
there must be a tuple of defaults δ1, . . . , δk and some n such that
δ1, . . . , δk ∈
⋂
m>n
(
Θ∗m −Θ−m
)
,
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and moreover
C(δ1), . . . ,C(δk) |=W P(δ).
Then δ1, . . . , δk ∈ (Θ∗ −Θ−) whence C(Θ∗ −Θ−) |=W P(δ), as required. 2
Appendix B. Infinitely many defaults
Here we indicate briefly how to extend the present approach to default theories (W,∆)
comprising infinitely many defaults. For simplicity, we consider only categorical default
theories, which form a natural and well-behaved class. As observed in Section 1 (and in
particular in the proof of Theorem 1.6), the hypothesis that ∆ is finite is used only once,
in order to obtain a certain combinatorial fact. The general case where ∆ is infinite can be
handled as follows.
Definition B.1. Let (W,∆) be a categorical default theory, and δ, γ ∈∆. Then δ is below
γ , denoted δ ≺ γ iff and only if there are defaults δ1, . . . , δn such that:
C(δ1), . . . ,C(δn),C(δ) |=W ¬J (γ ),
but for no proper subset Γ0 ⊂ {δ1, . . . , δn, δ} we have C(Γ0) |=W ¬J (γ ).
In other words, δ ≺ γ iff δ is part of a minimal tuple of defaults pre-empting γ .
Definition B.2. Let (W,∆) be a categorical default theory. For each δ ∈∆, put:
rk(δ)= sup{rk(γ )+ 1: γ ∈∆& γ ≺ δ},
if such a sup exists, and rk(δ)=∞ otherwise (in which case we say that rk(δ) is undefined).
Similarly, put rk(∆)= sup{rk(δ): rk(δ) is defined}.
It is then possible to carry out the construction of Theorem 1.6 transfinitely through
the ordinal rk(∆) appropriately taking unions at limit stages. It is not difficult to see that
this yields a general extension. The crucial step is that if δ1, . . . , δn is a (minimal) n-tuple
pre-empting δ then rk(δi) < rk(δ) for every i , so we can apply an appropriate inductive
hypothesis to conclude that such an n-tuple must have a member in Γ −.
As an added bonus, we have the following: for any default theory (W,∆), let the well-
founded part of ∆ be Θ = {δ: rk(δ) is defined}. Then it can be verified that any general
extension for (W,∆) is a classical extension for (W,Θ).
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